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Abstract—This paper introduces a new micropayment
scheme, suitable for all kinds of transactions, and does
not require online transactions for either the payer or
payee. The designed method uses an encrypted data
structure called Codex which self replicates to represent
the current values of both the payer and the payee. The
model, while providing fraud detection also guarantees
payment & loss recovery.
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I.

micropayments,

codex,

sustainability, fraud detection, loss recovery and
guarantee of payment while resistant to double
spending, counterfeiting and man in the middle
attack.
II. RELATED WORK
Most currently-used protocols for Internet
e-commerce are based on credit card charging over
SSL [Hic95]. Such schemes require the merchant
to perform a hidden (from the user’s point of view)
online credit check. The cost of such checks can be
on the order of 10 (US) cents, making them
expensive for low-value transactions. The more
recently developed SET [SET] and CyberCash
protocols [EBCY96] do not address this issue.

secure

PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

Current offline payment systems are not well
matched to occasional, low-valued transactions.
(For the purposes of this discussion, we use the
term “electronic payment system" broadly, to
encompass conventional credit cards, debit cards,
online and offline digital cash, etc.) Online
electronic payment systems (which require access
to a server for each transaction) provide security
but they cause overload for the issuing authorities
such as “Banks”. Also, as these are
micropayments,
and their currency value is
relatively lower, the overload for the banks to
supervise each and every micropayment makes it
unnecessary burden. And for the users, since
micropayments
are done very frequently,
contacting bank for each and every transaction is
an overload and needs to be avoided. In addition,
considering the online connectivity issues, we can
infer that an offline payment system (which allows
transactions with no server) is very important.
Currently the computational capacities of all hand
held devices has increased drastically, so a
computation intensive but secure payment system
is agreeable to most of the users. Electronic
payments face several challenges such as double
spending, counterfeiting, man in the middle, etc.
Loss recovery, guarantee of payment and fraud
detection are other features that are much required
in an electronic payment system. Till now several
electronic payment systems were proposed but
there is not yet a sustainable offline electronic
payment system which is not susceptible to double
spending, counterfeiting, man in the middle attack,
etc and has features like fraud detection, loss
recovery and guarantee of payment. Our objective
is to develop a framework for such an offline
micropayment system which has features like

NetBill [CTS95] is a transactional payment
protocol
with
many
advanced
features
(atomicity, group membership, pseudonyms, etc.)
that require communication with the NetBill
server for each transaction, thus exhibiting the
same drawback with respect to micropayments as
the simpler online protocols already mentioned.
Other general-purpose payment protocols [NM95,
BGH95, FB98] are unattractive for micropayments
for these same reasons.
Digital cash-based systems [Cha82, Cha92, MN94,
BGJY98, dST98] provide many desirable
features (potentially total anonymity, inherent offline operation), but do not directly address the issue
of double-spending (fraud). Some e-cash systems
use online checking (thus negating the off-line
operation capability). Others rely on detection after
the fact, which introduces the potential for largescale simultaneous multiple-spending. The same
drawback is manifest in several micropayment
procotols, such as PayWord [RS], PayTree
[JY96], micro-iKP [HSW96], and others [Tan95].
While the double-spending possibility is an
inherent property of all such systems, none of the
above protocols employ any kind of risk
management scheme to address it.
NetCents [PHS98] and Millicent [Man95] are
scrip-based
off-line-friendly
micropayment
protocols. As the monetary unit used in these
protocols is vendor-specific, double-spending is
made very difficult (if not impossible). The
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assumption behind both protocols is that people
tend to re-use the same merchants repeatedly. If
this assumption holds, the interactions between the
customer and the bank are kept at a minimum. A
hidden assumption is that merchants have ¸Stotal
information ˇT over their sales, so double-spending
with the same merchant is detectable. If the
merchant has many distinct points of sale, the
potential for double-spending is re-introduced,
unless continuous communication and database
synchronization is maintained between the different
points. This would consequently negate the benefits
of off-line operation.

Person-to-person (P2P) payment systems, such as
PayPal or X.com (now merged), allow users to
exchange money online. Typically, the provider’s
web server needs to be contacted and an instruction
issued for a money transfer. In that respect, the
transaction is very similar to a bank wire transfer.
There also exist modules that allow users to
directly exchange money through palmtop
computers. Such systems typically have no built-in
security mechanisms; in the best of circumstances,
they are a straight variant of offline digital cash.
While our system can operate on its own, it could
also be integrated in some type of electronic wallet.
Finally, the use of a PDA as an electronic wallet is
not new and our system can be built into a PDA.

IBM’s MiniPay [HY96, Her98] uses a protocol that
is somewhat similar to that described in this paper.
MiniPay was developed primarily for use within a
web browser, and a lot of effort has gone into the
user interface aspect. Risk management is
implemented as a decision to perform an online
check with the billing server based on the total
spending by the customer that day, and some
parameter set by the merchant. The billing provider
cannot customize risk-management parameters on a
per-customer and/or per-merchant basis.

III. DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION
We propose a new micropayment scheme,
suitable for micropayments, and does not require
online transactions for either the payer or payee.

Fig. 1: Class Diagram of User
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Some important classes used in the implementation
of the model.

payer acknowledging the receipt and acceptance of
token.

TransactionMonitor: It is a continuously
monitoring process on the user end and it specifies
the respective execution path for the process. It
receives two commands, ‘receive payment’ and
‘make payment’. If the command is make payment,
then it follows the path: ‘create token’ → ‘send to
payee’ → ‘Write Log’ → ‘Modify and Update
Codex’.

LogWriter: Information regarding the token id,
token, date, time, transaction, etc are written to log.
This log will be later copied down by the bank. The
bank uses this log to balance all the transactions
and updates its own database. Thus the bank has a
fair idea on how much a user has in his account,
though he/she has not approached the bank. For
example, if Alice becomes a user of this
micropayment scheme with an initial amount of Rs.
10 and so does Bob with Rs 10. After creating the
accounts of Alice and Bob, the bank also maintains
its own database of its users along with their
account information. If Alice makes payments
worth Rs 10 to Bob, then her account has zero
balance. She then goes to the bank to credit her
account with more money, the bank before
crediting amount into her account (i.e. updating her
Codex), they copy her previous Codex and extract
all her transactions. Through her transactions, it is
evident that she paid Rs 10 to Bob. So they add this
information to Bob’s account. Thus the bank
knows that Bob has Rs 600 in his account, though
Bob has not been to the bank yet. Later Bob comes
to the bank to credit money to his account or
withdraw cash out of his account, and since the
bank already knows how much Bob has in his
account it can detect if Bob’s account is prone to
fraud or not.

If the command is receive payment, then it follows
the path: ‘receive & decrypt token’ → ‘check
blacklist’ → ‘Write Log’ → ‘Modify and Update
Codex’.
Create Token: This process creates a payment
token. The token identifies the payer and the payee.
The token also has a token which identifies it
uniquely.
TokenDispatcher: This process sends the token to
the payee and also ensures that it is received
properly. It waits until it receives the
acknowledgment from the payee.
CodexModifier: This process modifies the
Codex of both the payer and the payee to represent
the present value, contain the token id, and the
present transaction.

• ActivityMonitor: It is a continuously
monitoring process on the bank end and it specifies
the respective paths for the processes. It receives
five commands, ‘create account’, ‘delete account’,
‘update Codex’, ‘create blacklist’, and ‘check
consistency’. Depending on the command, it
decides the execution path for the process.

Receive & Decrypt Token: Every payment
involves a token. Since the token contains
information which is necessary for detecting and
avoiding fraud, it is usually encrypted. This token
is decrypted in this process and values are
extracted.
Check Blacklist & Send Ack : The bank creates
and maintains a database of fraudulent users called
the blacklist. The user also gets a copy of the
blacklist when he becomes a member, and also he
can update his blacklist whenever he feels the need.
In the decrypted token one of the value that is
extracted is the payer. Now this payer is checked
against the blacklist; if the user is not found in the
blacklist, token is accepted. An Ack message is
also sent to the

• AccountCreator: The process creates an account
for a new user.
• CodexCreator: The process creates a new
Codex encrypting the username, userid, amount,
expiry date, and other essential information.

• UpdateBankRepository: The process
updates the bank’s database with the new
user’s information and Codex details.
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Fig 2: Class Diagram of Bank

IV.

• RetrieveLog: Before updating an account (i.e.
adding credit balance to an account), deleting an
account or creating a blacklist, the log contained in
the user’s Codex is retrieved.

STRUCTURE OF CODEX

Codex, which is in an encrypted form, is comprised
of the following four layers.
User Information Layer: This layer consists of
user’s details like username, userid, address,
account creation date, etc. This layer is basically
for user identification and user information.

• Check Consistency: The process checks for
the consistency of the transactions by balancing
them. However, the total amount in all the user’s
accounts should be equal to the total amount
dispersed by the bank. If this condition is not
satisfied then it indicates the possibility of fraud.
Also, as the Token_Ids of each transaction are
saved, tracing the fraudulent transactions becomes
easier.

Financial Information Layer: This layer consists
of financial information of the account, details such
as present balance, secure deposit at the bank,
number of transactions that were made, list of all
transactions, token IDs that were generated, token
IDs that were received, etc.

• UpdateAccount: If the transactions are found to
be balancing, then the process updates the Codex of
the user to represent the new amount.

Management Layer: This layer consists of
information required by the management.
Information such as when the account is going to
be expired, Log of the user, performance Index of
the user, etc.

• DeleteAccount: If the transactions are found to
be balancing, then the process safely deletes the
account.

Security Layer: This layer is meant for proactive
fraud detection and prevention. Security layer

•

CreateBlacklist: If the transactions are not
balancing, then the users whose accounts show
wrong data are identified and added to blacklist.

consists of a blacklist so that before a
transaction could occur, the user’s process
checks whether the payer is a fraudster or not.
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Fig 3: Structure of Codex

Fig 5: Architecture
On Bob’s side, after receiving the payment token
from Alice, Bob updates his Codex such that it now
represents his new balance, and contains the
present transaction details, payment token id.

Fig. 4: Structure of Payment Token

V. OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOR OF THE
PROPOSED MODEL

A. Axioms:

The proposed model functions using an
encrypted message called Codex, and it assumes
that the algorithm used for generation of Codex is
protected from physical theft. Codex is a
dynamically updated encrypted message and
contains user’s details such as user_name, user_id,
amount, count of transactions, list of all
previous transactions specifying transaction_id,
date, amount, payee_name, payee_id, etc for each
transaction. Also each codex is uniquely
identifiable.

Ti, Tj {T | T is a Token}, Ti.tokenID ≠
T j.tokenID
Ti
token, s1, s2
Time | s1 ≠ s2 ,
generated(Ti,s1) ≠ generated(Ti,s2)
pay(X,Y)
createToken(X)
updateCodex(Y)

updateCodex(X)

createToken(X)
Amount(X) >0
(value(Token) < current_balance(X) )
expired(X)

When a user Alice registers as a member of the
payment scheme, the bank will create an account
for her and a Codex is initialized for Alice. This
Codex is also saved in bank’s database against
Alice’s account. Suppose, Alice wants to pay an
amount X to Bob, then two things happen on
Alice’s side. Firstly, a payment token which
contains the details such as token id, amount, date,
time, transaction id, payer username, payer id,
payee username, payee id,etc in encrypted form is
generated from Alice’s Codex.

¬

updateCodex(X)
update(Codex, new Amount)
add(Codex,TokenId) add(Codex, trans_details)

VI. SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE SYSTEM
The proposed model has some special features
be-sides allowing payments offline.
A. Fraud Detection
There are several possibilities of fraud since
the payment is not in physical form but in digital
form. Even physical form of money also has
problem of fraud as the fraudsters can print fake
currency notes. However, we can solve the problem
of fraud in Ecash to a maximum extent using
cryptographic techniques and a consistent model

Secondly, the Codex of Alice is updated. The
Codex modified so as to represent the present
balance, count of transactions, and also the token id
and token. The more payments Alice makes, the
more payment tokens are generated, and Codex is
updated to contain all the transactions details.
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that supports fraud detection. Our model makes
room for fraud detection and prevention.

B. Guarantee of Payment & Loss Recovery:
The model provides several measures to overcome
fraud. Proactive fraud detection and prevention
methods prevent most of the fraudulent payments.
But still if the mechanism did not work properly
and it was identified that a user was made a false
payment, then the Bank identifies the payer by
balancing its accounts. It may take time for the
bank to balance the accounts because all the users
will not approach the bank at the same time. To
deal with this issue, the bank may so design the
Codex that it will expire after a limited period of
time or after a specified number of transactions. In
such a case, the fraudster cannot continue making
false payments forever. The bank also makes the
users make a safe deposit for each account. And,
when a false payment was identified, and the payer
was also identified, the bank will make the payment
from the safe deposit of the false payer. Thus the
user is guaranteed of payment. The bank also
recovers its loss from the safe deposit. Despite all
the security measures implemented by the bank, if
still some false payments are made, the loss will be
minimal since these are micropayments.

Proactive Fraud Detection: Detecting the fraud
after it has happened is not always beneficial. Our
model supports proactive fraud detection and
provides two techniques for prevention of fraud.
First technique is that every user is provided with a
blacklist of fraudsters. And, before a user receives
a payment from any payer, the user checks to see
whether the payer is in the blacklist. If the payer’s
id is found in the blacklist, the transaction is
canceled. Secondly technique is useful when
the payer’s name is not in the blacklist. This is the
case when the payer might try to generate payment
tokens though he does not have amount in his
account. Our model overcomes this problem
because of the Codex. The Codex is encrypted and
self modifies to reflect the current balance of the
account. When the token generating algorithm
accesses the Codex, it realizes that the amount is
zero, and token generating activity is canceled.
Double Spending: The problem of double
spending comes only with Ecash. There are two
cases in double spending. Firstly, a payer might try
to pay the same payment token to two people. To
overcome this problem, our model insists on
generating tokens which are specific to a payee.
Thus, if a user ‘A’ wants to generate a token ‘Ti’
for a payee ‘B’, then ‘B’ is required to provide his
username and userid. Then, A will generate a
payment token that can only be accepted by ‘B’.
On B’s end, before receiving any payment token,
B’s process will check the payment token whether
it is meant for B or not. In this manner, double
spending can be avoided.

VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated a simple and, for some
applications, practical scheme for offline
micropayments without the overhead of online
transaction authorization. Our scheme represents a
departure from the usual approach to designing
such systems. In particular, we chose to prevent
losses, rather than allowing them by providing
anonymity.
VII.

Secondly, a payer may try to pay with the same
token to the same payee. So, in this case checking
for specificity alone then it is not enough. It brings
us to the need of identifying each token. Hence the
token generating algorithm includes a ‘token ID’ in
each payment token. Now, if the payee receives the
same ‘token ID’ twice, then he will be able to
identify and reject it. Also, each token has date and
time stamps which help in hinting if the token is an
old one.Man-in-the-middle: Man in the middle
problem is a situation where someone is
eavesdropping. The eavesdropper tries to capture
the payment tokens and tries to pay to the payee as
though they are his own tokens. Our model
overcomes this problem by making the payment
token carry the digital signature of the payer. So,
even if someone does eavesdropping and stole the
token, they cannot claim it.

FUTURE WORK

•

Developing the Codex and encryption for
the Codex

•

Developing the Payment Token

•

Developing the algorithms that modify the
Codex, receive payment tokens, etc
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